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1. Summary 
This rapid literature review finds that the medium- to long-term effects of Covid-19 on geopolitics 
in East Africa are unknown. In the immediate term, the pandemic is likely to put stress on 
economies and healthcare systems, and thereby have the potential to exacerbate regional 
conflicts. It is also likely lead to East African countries re-evaluating their relationships with other 
countries in the region and further afield as they seek financial help from abroad (e.g. debt relief), 
and to build more resilience to global shocks. 
This rapid literature review outlines the main geopolitical issues in the region and notes where 
authors have suggested Covid-19 may lead to a change. For the purposes of this review, East 
Africa is taken to include Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. This literature 
review notes the main issues for the region, and where Covid-19 has been posited to have an 
effect. This is a companion review to one on conflict and security in the region (Mergersa, 2020). 
The main issues highlighted in the literature are: 
 Covid-19 will lead to a short-term reduction in trade, investment and aid from abroad, and 
will have severe economic, social and political effects on some states. Predictions on 
how long Covid-related economic downturns will last vary (e.g. World Bank, 2020d, 
2020a, 2020c, 2020b, 2020e). Some have pointed to Covid-19 as a long-term opportunity 
for increased African integration and localisation of production (e.g. pharmaceuticals). 
 There is no evidence on the specific effect of Covid-19 on regional conflicts or border 
disputes between states. While some discussions have stalled (e.g. Somalia-Kenya 
maritime dispute; Egypt and Ethiopia's dispute over the GERD dam), there is no 
evidence that Covid-19 specifically is having an effect on the outcome of disputes. 
 The need for aid and debt relief from the economic downturn may lead East African 
states to reconfigure their relationships with the rest of the world. States in the region 
already seek to benefit from competition between different Middle Eastern powers, the 
US and China, through investment and support, and are likely to need increased aid and 
loans in the near future. Covid-19 may increase all African states' wariness towards 
Chinese investment amid worries about 'debt-trap diplomacy', or conversely to seek 
increased infrastructural support from China. 
 The World Bank, IMF, China and others have provided emergency financing and 
cancelled some debts. However, given the falls in trade across the region, financial 
support will continue to be needed, and may present an opportunity for increased 
leverage by these actors. 
 Despite some 'health diplomacy', it is unclear whether China and other foreign states will 
seek to maintain their investment and aid in East Africa after Covid-19, as domestic 
pressures may lead them to reduce foreign investment. 
 Covid-19 may increase intra-African co-operation through the African Union and the 
AfCFTA, although some states may turn inwards. Most commentators highlight the value 
of increased integration within the continent. 
 There is no evidence on the specific effect of Covid-19 on national foreign policies in the 
region, although all countries are likely to face increased economic and social strains, 
and may therefore seek increased outside support and seek to re-orient foreign policies. 
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The evidence base for this question is weak. Most analyses of East African geopolitics pre-date 
Covid-19. This literature review has therefore included policy briefs, blogs and news articles 
alongside peer-reviewed articles and longer reports. Nevertheless, discussions of the effects of 
Covid-19 are focused on the short-term effects on health systems and economies, with some 
discussion of internal politics (e.g. increased authoritarianism or instability). Where longer-term 
geopolitics are mentioned, discussion is brief and conclusions are tentative. The evidence was 
largely ‘gender-blind’ and did not discuss disability.  
2. Regional effects 
East Africa is characterised by a number of regional disputes as well as global contests. 
South Sudan and Somalia remain unstable, while aid and investment from China, the US and the 
Middle East means the region is significantly influenced by global events (IARAN, 2017, pp. 9–
12). The Horn of Africa has become the site of great power competition. Its location at a 
'chokepoint' for global trade, its proximity to the Middle East, and the security issues arising from 
terrorism and piracy in the region, make it significant to a number of countries (HORN 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019). For example, Djibouti's position on the Bad al-
Mandab strait, a 'chokepoint' on global trade routes, gives its a position of economic and political 
significant. Its ports aim to become logistics hubs. It may also become a site of US-China 
competition, as China has built its first overseas base a few miles from a US base. China's Belt 
and Road Initiative aims to develop Djibouti, but some have expressed fears that it is a 'debt trap' 
and an outlet for Chinese excess production. While Covid-19 will have hurt Djibouti's economy, 
'it is too early to discern the long-term implications for Djibouti’s economic trajectory or 
for China’s role in the region'. In the short-term some African countries may default or call for a 
renegotiation of rates. In the longer-term, some may seek to reduce dependence on Chinese 
money and trade (Vertin, 2020). 
The immediate effects of Covid-19 in East Africa will be economic. The global economic 
effects of coronavirus mean there will likely be falls in trade, remittances and FDI in the region 
(Kacana Sipangule Khadjavi et al., 2020). The Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 
2035 are less likely to be fulfilled. Similarly, potential reductions in migration, and therefore 
remittances, may lead to weaker economies and more violence in the Horn of Africa and 
elsewhere (Sidiropoulos, 2020). The fall in global oil prices will hit many African countries, such 
as South Sudan, which is highly dependent on oil exports. Workers in the informal economy will 
be hit by lockdowns. The region as a whole is dependent on global trade more than intra-
African trade, meaning downturns in Europe, Asia and America will certainly have an 
effect. Covid-19 and the associated economic downturn may severely test failed or fragile states. 
African countries have called for debt relief. The World Bank and the IMF initiated a Debt 
Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) and provided emergency financing (IMF, 2020; World Bank, 
2020a). However, the requirement that participants in the DSSI not seek any non-concessional 
loans that year, combined with fears that participation may be considered a default by creditors, 
has limited use and cancellations have been limited. China has cancelled interest-free loans to 
Africa, accounting for under 5% of Africa's debt to China. Although small, it does not prevent 
these countries taking other loans, and shows China has 'warmed to the idea of cancellations'. It 
may increase Chinese leverage in Africa, and decrease the ability of the West to link economic or 
governance reforms to their own aid (Paduano, 2020). Co-ordination between creditors is 
necessary to ensure the efficacy of these measures at a time when they are vital for the region 
(Paduano, 2020). Moreover, the situation presents an opportunity for the West and China to 
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compete in gaining influence in the region in the longer-term. One expert argued that China's 
provision of infrastructure is more valuable to East African states that Western humanitarian aid, 
and may increase in the medium term.  
There is wide agreement that Covid-19 means Africa should look to increase its 
integration. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was due to come into effect this 
year, but has been delayed by covid-19. Many suggest that it will help African economies grow 
and achieve more resilience to global shocks in future. An OECD analysis of the economic 
effects of Covid-19 points to lower trade and investment from China, a demand slump from 
OECD countries and a supply shock from lockdowns within Africa. It recommends that 'recovery 
strategies should include a strong structural component to reduce dependence on external 
financial flows and global markets, and develop more value-adding, knowledge-intensive and 
industrialised economies, underpinned by a more competitive and efficient services sector. 
Effective implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the African 
Union’s productive transformation agenda can strengthen regional value chains, reduce 
vulnerability to external shocks, advance the digital transition, and build economic resilience 
against future crises' (OECD, 2020; See also Khadjavi et al., 2020; UN, 2020). 
Many commentators point to the value of the African Continental Free Trade Area 
(AfCTFA) for the whole of Africa, but there is no solid evidence on what the effect of 
Covid-19 might be beyond delaying its implementation.1 There is little information on its 
specific effects on the Horn of Africa, although most commentators point to its likely positive 
effects on economic growth. A briefing by the Nanyang Business School (Singapore) on the 
effects of Covid-19 in Africa suggests that trading under the AfCFTA may be delayed by border 
closures. In the medium to long-term, these and xenophobia or falls in trade may lead to 'friction' 
between signatories and jeopardise free trade on the continent (Gopaldas, 2020). Brookings 
argues AfCFTA can make Africa more resilient by increasing intra-Africa trade.2 However, border 
restrictions have been put in place in response to Covid-19 and some have suggested that 
countries may withdraw to protect import taxes or to protect local industry (Bouët & Laborde, 
2020; Signé & van der Ven, 2020). A UN brief argues that the pandemic's effects show the need 
for Africa's free trade deal, as well as increased food security, the realisation of its 
pharmaceutical manufacturing plan, and resilient infrastructure (UN, 2020).  
Covid-19 may also delay reforms to the African Union (AU). The new African Union 
commission for 2021 will feature more merit-based recruitment (Institute for Security Studies, 
2020). The current review 'includes a review of the financing model of its operational and 
programme budgets, the transformation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) into the AU Development Agency (AUDA), and the integration of the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM) and its budget into existing AU structures' (Institute for Security 
Studies, 2020).  
Evidence on covid-19's effects on integration within the EAC is also limited. A report in 
April 2020 argued that the East African Community (EAC) is the only sub-regional community 
                                                   
1 A continent-wide free-trade area aiming to create a single market and remove barriers to trade. It was due to be 
launched on 1 July 2020, but has now been delayed. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/may-
2020/coronavirus/implementing-africa%E2%80%99s-free-trade-pact-best-stimulus-post-covid-19-economies 
2 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/04/30/how-the-afcfta-will-improve-access-to-essential-
products-and-bolster-africas-resilience-to-respond-to-future-pandemics/ 
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that appeared to have adopted an extensive formal collective approach to the Covid-19 
response, including relating cross-national boundary movements (Mboce & Muigua, 2020). 
However, there have been some suggestions that Covid-19 may prove to be a threat to EAC 
integration. Covid has led to unilateral border closures and some states thinking more about self-
sufficiency in health matters, and possibly economic matters (Moses Tetui, 2020). UNCTAD has 
offered training in national trade facilitation to EAC members to help keep goods flowing after 
Covid-19 (UNCTAD, 2020); however, it is unclear what effect this will have in the long term. 
Covid-19 may also compound other short-term issues such as a locust infestation.3 
There are three main regional organisations in East Africa: the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD). 
Figure 1: Membership of regional organisations 
Country COMESA EAC IGAD 
Djibouti X  X 
Ethiopia X  X 
Kenya X X X 
Somalia X  X 
South Sudan  X X 
Sudan X  X 
Source: Reproduce with kind permission from Mwita Chacha, University of Birmingham 
 
A Centre for Strategic and International Studies blog suggests that Africa as a whole may 
reassess its relationships with the world. It may become more assertive on climate change, 
trade and other issues. It argues that 'Africans almost certainly will renew their commitment to 
regional integration and multilateralism'. However, they may re-evaluate ties with foreign 
countries, such as China (Judd Devermont, 2020). Africa is particularly reliant on multi-lateral 
institutions for support, so American and Chinese rivalry, a weak UN response, and undermining 
of the WHO, are therefore bad signs for Africa (de Waal, 2020).  
Some have speculated that Africa should seek to change the terms of trade and finance. A 
blog post argues that Africa, suffering from demand and supply shocks, should use Covid-19 to 
free itself of structural dependence on the rest of the world. It calls for Africa to seek debt 
cancellation, and to create pan-African credit facilities. It includes no specific discussion of East 
Africa (Carlos Cardoso & Toby Green, 2020).  
                                                   
3 https://igad.int/2429-igad-calls-for-increased-regional-collaboration-to-fight-desert-locust 
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The EU and Africa may reshape their relationship, although there is no concrete evidence 
of what this might mean for East Africa specifically. The Cotonou agreement between the 
EU and AU runs out in 2021, making it a 'pivotal year' for relations (Nicole Koenig & Anna Stahl, 
2020). The EU-African Union Summit in Brussels in October 2020 aims to realign the relationship 
between the regions. The focus will be on green transition and energy access, digital 
transformation, sustainable growth and jobs, peace and governance, migration and mobility. 
Priorities include a desire for a less securitised relationship, migration and green investment.  
Covid-19 has also created possible opportunities for Africa from Europe 'relocalising' production 
(Andrew Lebovich, 2020). However, there are no specific predictions for the effect on the EU-
East Africa relationship. 
The influence of Middle Eastern countries in the Horn of Africa has grown in recent years. 
The region has become a site of competition between, on the one hand, the Gulf Cooperation 
countries of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and on the other, Turkey and Qatar (Melvin, 2019). 
Eritrea and Sudan have committed troops to Saudi Arabia and the UAE's war in Yemen. Turkey, 
Qatar, the UAE have invested in ports and infrastructure on the Horn. 
Commentators are divided on how Africa may re-align its engagement with China. China 
invests in and trades with all the countries surveyed. Many states have called for debt relief. 
However, it is unclear how this will play out (Maini, 2020; Van Staden, 2020). Covid may also 
change public opinion on China. China has practised health diplomacy by sending medical 
equipment to fight Covid and helped build an African Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
research facility in Nairobi, but racism against Africans in China has generated outrage (Crisis 
Group, 2020a; Meservey, 2020; Shiferaw, 2020). One commentator argues that 'South–South 
cooperation à la China style may accelerate, and may be a conclusive pivot of Africa to China – 
the result of a combination of China’s efforts to change the narrative on COVID-19 and the 
West’s focus on dealing with its own domestic outbreak. However, will China provide debt relief 
to those countries that have been affected by COVID-19, or will it avoid that?' (Sidiropoulos, 
2020). 
A number of factors have been highlighted as shaping the relationship between Africa and China. 
These include (Gopaldas, 2020): 
 Covid-based racism against Africans in Guangzhou may taint China's image in Africa. 
The incidents led to a diplomatic rebuke by countries including Kenya and Uganda. 
 Likely to be used by African countries in negotiations over debt. China wants leverage 
over states and access to infrastructure, but needs goodwill. 
 The situation may lead to more criticism of 'debt trap diplomacy' 
 Chinese Covid-diplomacy, including sending equipment and supporting infrastructure, 
may improve China's image. 
 Some African states may request reparations from China for Covid-19  
 Covid will bring an 'inevitable shift in global supply chain contingencies' 
 China may focus its investment inwards, or 'accelerate' its investment in Africa to take 
advantage of others' retreat from globalism. 
China may also curtail 'belt and road' investments to focus on domestic investment (Gopaldas, 
2020). However, some argue that China will maintain its interest in the BRI and African 
investment (Calabrese, 2020). China's investment in East Africa is largely centred on 
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infrastructure development and strategy, as the countries have relatively few natural resources. 
South Sudan is particularly dependent on China for oil exports, however. 
It is unclear how Covid-19 might affect China's strategic role in the region. The first 
overseas Chinese military base was opened in Djibouti, near a US base, on the strategically 
important Bab el-Mandeb Strait. China also has two dialogue platforms for the Red Sea: Forum 
on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF). 
Its interest in the Horn is more focused on economic factors than security, but shows a long-term 
aim to control sea lines of communication. It is unlikely to intervene in local conflicts. However, it 
does derive some political benefit as Red Sea states have shown support for China in Xinjiang, 
for example. East African sea states do not want to have to choose between US and China 
(Cannon & Donelli, 2020; Cheru, 2016; Vertin, 2020). 
There are many border disputes in East Africa including the Kenya-Somalia maritime dispute; 
the ongoing dispute over the Ilemi Triangle between Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia; and dispute 
over Lake Victoria’s Migingo Island with Uganda. Somalia and Ethiopia also dispute a border 
(Onguny, 2020). Egypt and Sudan dispute Ethiopia's right to operate the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam (GERD) upstream from them on the Nile, as it will likely affect their water 
supplies (Crisis Group, 2020b). The relationship between Somalia and Somaliland also remains 
an issue. In Djibouti, supported by Ethiopia and Djibouti, Somaliland and Somalia established a 
'joint technical committee to resume talks over Somaliland’s claim to sovereignty which broke 
down in 2015; in following days, committee failed to make significant headway, but both sides 
agreed to form joint subcommittees to discuss technical issues in July'.4 Moreover, the federal 
government of Somalia remains wary of foreign interference with its regions. Some peace 
processes have been postponed, while others are continuing via video-link. 
3. Countries in the region 
Sudan 
The removal of President al-Bashir in late 2019 may lead to a weakening of Sudan's role. A 
recent article argues that Sudan will have less influence abroad, while foreign states will have 
more influence in Sudan. Sudan's role in brokering peace in South Sudan may decline, for 
example. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt are supporting the transitional government 
economically: all want Sudan onside with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and to prevent 
the Muslim brotherhood gaining ground (ISSAfrica.org, 2020b). In addition, Sudan recently 
agreed to pay compensation to US victims of terrorism in order to be 'de-listed' as a state 
sponsor of terrorism and improve relations with the US (Fabricius, 2020).  
Covid-19's economic effects may make Sudan's transitional government more reliant on 
foreign support. It may also threat social stability in the country (Mergersa, 2020). However, 
it is unclear what effect these destabilising factors will have on Sudan's international position. 
South Sudan 
South Sudan is highly fragile economically and politically. It is reliant on oil exports, which 
will be hit by the economic downturn. Its debt-to-GDP ratio and low capacity to service its debt 
                                                   
4 https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/july-alerts-and-june-trends-2020#somalia 
8 
indicate 'unsustainable debt dynamics' (World Bank, 2020e). It is also reliant on humanitarian aid 
and peacekeeping forces, both of which are likely to be affected by Covid-19 (Mergersa, 2020). 
Covid-19 is therefore a threat to its stability in the short-term. 
Since removal of Al Bashir in Sudan, South Sudan has lost its 'guarantor' for the 2018 
Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Another country, the 
AU or IGAD may have to fill this role (Atta-Asamoah & Mahmood, 2019). The UK, US, South 
Africa and Norway have also put pressure on the country's factions to share power (A Major Step 
Toward Ending South Sudan’s Civil War, 2020). It is therefore unclear how exactly Covid-19 will 
affect the peace process and South Sudan's role in the region, beyond noting uncertainty. 
Kenya 
Kenya hopes to drive development and exercise regional leadership. Its Blue Economy 
project is focused on ocean-based resources through the Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia 
Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) project with South Sudan and Ethiopia (David Goldman, 2020). 
Kenya has recently been elected to the Security Council, meaning that it can influence the 
Council's stance on issues such as peace in Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan (ISSAfrica.org, 
2020b). The country has also recently begun bilateral trade negotiations with the US, which 
some argue potentially jeopardises its obligations under AfCFTA and the EAC (Ogutu, 2020). 
Kenya's relationship with Somalia is one of its most significant, and has several 
dimensions. These include the involvement of the Kenyan Defence Forces in Somalia under the 
African Union Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) efforts to cripple Al-Shabaab insurgency; security 
fears around al-Shabaab among Somali refugees in Kenya; and concerns over piracy and 
criminal activities along the countries' shared coastline (Onguny, 2020). The two countries also 
dispute a 100km maritime border. From Kenya's perspective, Somalia's claim would restrict 
Kenya's access to Mombasa and its influence in the Indian Ocean. The disputed area contains 
significant oil and gas reserves (HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019, p. 22). 
Kenya has begun withdrawal from ANISOM in Somalia. This marks return to its traditional 
'passive and restrained' foreign policy, but leaves al-Shabaab with power, and Ethiopia in a 
stronger position in Somalia (Hansen, 2020) 
The country's relationship with China may be re-evaluated in the light of Covid-19, 
although there is little substantial evidence on this. China is partly interested in Kenya as 
South Sudanese and Ugandan oil can be exported through the country. It has invested in 
infrastructure, and is one of Kenya's biggest trading partners (Joy Muthanje Mwaniki, 2020). 
Since the Covid outbreak, there have been several high-profile incidents: racism against 
Kenyans in Wuhan and Guangzhou, but also Chinese health diplomacy in supplying Covid 
equipment. A recent article suggests the possibility of increasing its manufacturing capacity to 
improve its balance of trade with China. It also suggests Kenya should seek to renegotiate its 
debt with China, but may have to take out more loans instead. There is, however, no evidence on 
the viability of these suggestions (Joy Muthanje Mwaniki, 2020). 
Somalia 
Somalia will be affected by the economic problems brought by Covid-19 in the near-term. 
For instance, approximately 40% of its population receives remittances, which may come under 
strain from Covid-related economic downturns in the West (Nisar Majid et al., 2020). The World 
Bank suggests that the country's growth outlook is 'only moderately downgraded' in the medium-
9 
term, but this is 'Presuming that the global health pandemic related to COVID-19 is contained 
within the next two months' (World Bank, 2020d). It is also likely to face more instability as its 
federal states or al-Shabaab resist federal control, which is likely to be worsened if severe health, 
economic or public order effects of Covid-19 erode the legitimacy of the federal government 
(Weber, 2020). 
Somalia remains fractured, and many states have some sort of economic or strategic 
influence in Somalia. Ethiopia and Turkey support the central government, but countries have 
also built relationships with Somalia's semi-autonomous provinces (e.g. Somaliland, Jubaland). 
Since, 2017 Turkey has trained the Somali National Army. It has also invested in Somaliland, 
and helped to push out investment from the UAE (Cannon & Donelli, 2020). AMISOM, the AU's 
peacekeeping mission, has had troops deployed in the country since 2007 and Ethiopia and 
Kenya have both sought to influence the country. Taiwan has recently established ties with 
Somaliland, which may exacerbate US-China competition in the Horn (Aspinwall, 2020). 
Foreign powers intervening in Somalia do so for a number of reasons  (HORN International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019, p. 20): 
• Religious and cultural ties (Islam and Arab cultural influence)    
• Geographical proximity to the Middle East    
• Geostrategic location along the Indian Ocean and one of the busiest sea trade routes in 
the world.    
• Commercial position as a stabilising economy and trade hub, evident in several busy sea 
and air ports (e.g. Kismayu, Mogadishu and Berbera).    
• To counter terrorism and counter Islamist fundamentalism (e.g. al Shabaab).  
• Peacekeeping. AMISOM has operated in Somalia since 2007. 
• Political competition between the Saudi Arabia-UAE alliance and the Qatar-Turkey 
‘coalition.’    
• Military objectives; military bases (Turkish base in Mogadishu, and a UAE base in 
Berbera, the latter used in the war in Yemen)    
With regards to the strength of Turkish and Qatari links with Somalia, Donelli (2020) argues that 
Covid-19 may not diminish the relationship. Turkish presence in Somalia 'has not developed 
dependency relationships, but has sought to establish co-operative or even partnership 
relationships. As a result, many of the bonds established in recent years by Turkey with African 
countries may be maintained even in the face of a drastic reduction in resources allocated to the 
continent.' In addition, Qatari natural gas means it is expected to be able to weather Covid-19, 
meaning it will continue to be able to support Somalia in the short-term. Following Covid-19, 
Middle Eastern rivals have sought to help Somalia with medical equipment, although the 
strategic implications of this remain to be seen (Donelli, 2020). 
Covid-19 has delayed the possible resolution of a dispute between Somalia and Kenya. 
Somalia disputes a 100km2 sea boundary with Kenya. It contains hydro-carbons and is therefore 
economically significant to both countries. The dispute has been taken to the International Court 
of Justice, but the ruling has been postponed until 2021 because of Covid-19. Somalia is also 
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worried by Kenya's relationship with its Jubaland province and the Somaliland province, which 
exercises de facto independence. The economic and health implications of Covid-19 may further 
weaken the federal government's authority. 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is the dominant power in the horn of Africa. One scholar describes Ethiopia as an 
'imperfect hegemon' in the Horn of Africa (Le Gouriellec, 2018). Its size, with the second largest 
population in Africa, fast economic growth, and the third largest armed forces in Africa, provide a 
basis for it to exercise power. Its sense of exceptionalism is another factor leading it to seek 
hegemonic status. Since 2002, it has focused on economic development, aiming to become a 
lower middle-income country by 2025. It has sought regional stability, acting to 'police' the region, 
to help attain this. Peacekeeping forces create an image of the country as a 'security provider' 
and enable it to present itself as a safe place for investment, as well as to protect trade links 
across the region and to the sea. It dominates IGAD, the regional body, and has gained 
legitimacy on the world stage by being seen to fight terrorism through interventions in Somalia. 
Ethiopia's neighbours see its engagement as more self-interested, however (Le Gouriellec, 
2018). As the world's most populous landlocked country, it seeks access to the sea through 
neighbouring countries' ports, namely Asmara (Eritrea), Djibouti, or Lamu (Kenya), Kismayu 
(Somalia) (Cannon, 2017; David Goldman, 2020). As part of this strategy, President Abiy has 
worked to improve relation with Eritrea in recent years (Ylönen, 2018). Disruptions to these 
relationships may weaken Ethiopia's position. 
Ethiopia has received significant funding from the Middle East and elsewhere, but has 
sought to remain neutral with respect to broader geopolitical disputes. The United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) and Abu Dhabi are funding the Addis Ababa-Berbera highway, and the UAE is 
funding development in Berbera. The latter project is an implicit recognition of Somaliland. For 
Ethiopia it provides access to the sea. Moreover, a stable Somaliland can act as a buffer against 
an unstable Somalia and Al Shabaab (ISSAfrica.org, 2020a). It has attempted to stay neutral with 
regards to the competing power bases in the Middle East (Turkey and Qatar; Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE; and Iran) and has received investment from both Turkey and Saudi Arabia (Cannon & 
Donelli, 2020). China is a significant trading partner and has helped finance Ethiopia's 
infrastructure building, including contributing towards the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
(Cheru, 2016). The economic downturn has already hit Ethiopia's service sector and, combined, 
with a locust infestation, may, like everywhere else, have a significant effect on the country's 
economy, depending on how much it is contained (World Bank, 2020b). It may make Ethiopia 
more reliant on outside investment, reduce the availability of this investment, or increase the 
leverage of the investing countries. 
Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia remain in dispute following the construction of the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The dispute has the potential to escalate and resolution 
may require the help of regional or global actors. Following the collapse of talks in recent weeks, 
Ethiopia began filling the reservoir in July 2020 (Institute for Global Dialogue, 2020; Crisis Group, 
2020; BBC, ‘Nile Dam Reservoir Filling up - Ethiopia’, 2020). Ethiopia sees the dam as vital to its 
development (Pilling, 2020). Egypt and Sudan see it as a threat to their water supplies. Egypt is 
keen to get Ethiopia to agree to drought mitigation measures, as well as to agree to dispute 
resolution mechanisms in case of disagreements. Egypt fears a loss of water security, whereas 
Ethiopia sees some of the suggested provisions as a threat to its sovereign rights to resources, 
for which its citizens have contributed through patriotic bonds, and fears that an international 
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dispute resolution mechanism would likely favour Egypt (Ylönen, 2020). All sides see the dispute 
as integral to their national interests, and have yet to agree a compromise (Crisis Group, 2020b). 
Covid-19 is exacerbating political tensions in the country as opponents of the government 
express unhappiness with restrictive measures, delays to the elections, and economic 
problems (Yusuf, 2020). Elections have been called off and opposition groups have shown 
dissatisfaction (Mergersa, 2020). It is unclear what effect these internal disturbances with have 
on Ethiopia's external position or strategy. 
  
12 
4. References 
A Major Step Toward Ending South Sudan’s Civil War. (2020, February 25). Crisis Group. 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/major-step-toward-ending-south-
sudans-civil-war 
Aspinwall, N. (2020). Taiwan Throws a Diplomatic Curveball by Establishing Ties With 
Somaliland. Retrieved 15 July 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/taiwan-throws-a-
diplomatic-curveball-by-establishing-ties-with-somaliland/ 
Atta-Asamoah, A., & Mahmood, O. S. (2019). Sudan after Bashir: Regional opportunities and 
challenges. https://issafrica.org/research/east-africa-report/sudan-after-bashir-regional-
opportunities-and-challenges 
Nile dam reservoir filling up—Ethiopia. (2020, July 15). BBC News. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53416277 
Bouët, A., & Laborde, D. (2020). COVID-19 border policies create problems for African trade and 
economic pain for communities. https://wca.ifpri.info/2020/05/14/covid-19-border-policies-create-
problems-for-african-trade-and-economic-pain-for-communities/ 
Calabrese, L. (2020). China and global development: 12 things to read and watch in July. ODI. 
https://www.odi.org/blogs/17143-china-and-global-development-12-things-read-and-watch-july 
Cannon, B. J. (2017). Ethiopia, Berbera Port and the Shifting Balance of Power in the Horn of 
Africa. 23. https://1filedownload.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Ethiopia-Berbera-Port-And-
The-Shifting-Balance-Of-Power.pdf 
Cannon, B. J., & Donelli, F. (2020). Asymmetric alliances and high polarity: Evaluating regional 
security complexes in the Middle East and Horn of Africa. Third World Quarterly, 41(3), 505–524. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2019.1693255 
Cardoso, Carlos & Toby Green. (2020, June 25). How Africa can take this moment to end a 500-
years-old economic model. African Arguments. https://africanarguments.org/2020/06/25/how-
africa-can-take-this-moment-to-end-a-500-years-old-economic-model/ 
Cheru, F. (2016). Emerging Southern powers and new forms of South–South cooperation: 
Ethiopia’s strategic engagement with China and India. Third World Quarterly, 37(4), 592–610. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1116368 
Crisis Group. (2020, June 17). Nile Dam Talks: A Short Window to Embrace Compromise. Crisis 
Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/nile-dam-talks-short-window-
embrace-compromise 
Crisis Group. (2020a). COVID-19 and Conflict: Seven Trends to Watch | Crisis Group. 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/sb4-covid-19-and-conflict-seven-trends-watch 
Devermont, Judd. (2020). A Seat at the Table: African Leadership in a Post-Covid-19 World. 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/seat-table-african-leadership-post-covid-19-world 
de Waal, A. (2020). Governance Implications of Epidemic Disease in Africa: Updating the 
Agenda for COVID-19. 
13 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/104471/1/De_Waal_governance_implications_of_epidemic_disease_afric
a_published.pdf 
Donelli, F. (2020, May 29). Somalia and Beyond: Turkey in the Horn of Africa [Text]. ISPI. 
https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/somalia-and-beyond-turkey-horn-africa-26379 
Fabricius, P. (2020, May 29). Sudan does an about-turn in US relations. ISS Africa. 
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sudan-does-an-about-turn-in-us-relations 
Goldman, D., (2020). Kenya-Somalia Maritime Row: The Geopolitical Dimension of Regional 
Economics & Security – Strategic Intelligence Service. https://intelligencebriefs.com/kenya-
somalia-maritime-row-the-geopolitical-dimension-of-regional-economics-security/ 
Gopaldas, R. (2020). Africa Current Issues - COVID-19 in Africa: Outcomes and Scenarios. 
Nanyang Business School. https://doi.org/10.32655/AfricaCurrentIssues.2020.19 
Hansen, S. J. (2020). What Kenya stands to lose and gain by withdrawing from Somalia. The 
Conversation. http://theconversation.com/what-kenya-stands-to-lose-and-gain-by-withdrawing-
from-somalia-133640 
HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2019). Flirting with hyenas: HOW EXTERNAL 
INTERESTS ARE FUELING INSTABILITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. 
https://horninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Flirting-With-Hyenas.pdf 
IARAN. (2017). East Africa and the Horn in 2022 an Outlook for Strategic Positioning in the 
Region. https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/IARAN-East-Africa-to-2022-
revised.pdf 
IMF. (2020). Emergency Financing by Region. IMF. https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-
covid19/COVID-Lending-Tracker 
Institute for Global Dialogue. (2020). Spotlight on Africa mapping geopolitical trends Q1 2020. 
https://www.africaportal.org/publications/spotlight-africa-mapping-geopolitical-rends-quarter-one-
2020/ 
Institute for Security Studies. (2020). Peace & Security Council Report. 
https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/psc-125.pdf 
ISSAfrica.org. (2020, June 5). Abiy helps Somaliland put more facts on the ground. ISS Africa. 
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/abiy-helps-somaliland-put-more-facts-on-the-ground 
ISSAfrica.org. (2020b, June 22). SA passes Kenya the baton in the Security Council relay. ISS 
Africa. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sa-passes-kenya-the-baton-in-the-security-council-relay 
Kacana Sipangule Khadjavi, Tobias Stohr, & Rainer Thiele. (2020). EMERGING FROM COVID-
19: SCENARIOS FOR AFRICA. KIELER BEITRÄGE ZUR WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, 26(June), 
49–55. https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/-
ifw/Kieler_Beitraege_zur_Wirtschaftspolitik/wipo_26.pdf 
Koenig, Nicole, & Anna Stahl. (2020). How the coronavirus pandemic affects the EU’s 
geopolitical agenda. Hertie School Jacques Delors Centre. https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-
hsog/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/3520/file/20200424_EU_Solidarity_Koenig_Stahl.pdf 
14 
Le Gouriellec, S. (2018). Regional power and contested hierarchy: Ethiopia, an ‘imperfect 
hegemon’ in the Horn of Africa. International Affairs, 94(5), 1059–1075. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy117 
Lebovich. A (2020). After covid: Resetting Europe-Africa relations for mutual benefit. ECFR. 
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_after_covid_resetting_europe_africa_relations_for_mutu
al_benefit 
Mahmood, Omar s, & Atta-Asamoah, Andrews, (2019, September 18). With Bashir gone, the 
Horn faces a power shake-up. ISS Africa. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/with-bashir-gone-the-
horn-faces-a-power-shake-up 
Maini, T. S. (2020). Post-COVID-19: Will China’s ‘Debt Trap Diplomacy’ in Africa Falter? The 
Geopolitics. https://thegeopolitics.com/post-covid-19-will-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy-in-africa-
falter/ 
Majid, N., Abdirahman, K., Adan, G., & Kleist, N.. (2020, April 7). How Will Remittances Affect 
the Somali COVID-19 Response? [Text]. Conflict Research Programme Blog. 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/04/07/remittances-affect-the-somali-covid-19-response/ 
Mboce, H. N., & Muigua, K. (2020). Africa’s Regional Co-Operation and Integration: The Corona 
Virus Litmus Test. 4, 20. http://journalofcmsd.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Clean-Regional-
Co-operation-The-Corona-Virus-Disease-Litmus-Test.pdf 
Melvin, N. (2019). The new external security politics of the Horn of Africa Region. 32. 
https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-insights-peace-and-security/new-external-security-
politics-horn-africa-region 
Megersa, K. (2020). COVID-19 in Eastern Africa: impact analysis on conflict and security. K4D 
Helpdesk Report 847. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies 
Meservey, J. (2020). China’s Palace Diplomacy in Africa—War on the Rocks. 
https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/chinas-palace-diplomacy-in-africa/ 
Muthanje Mwaniki, Joy (2020). The Double Edged Sword: China-Kenya Relations in the wake of 
COVID-19 Pandemic. Horn Bulletin, 3(4). https://horninstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/07/HORN-Bulletin-Vol-III-%E2%80%A2-Iss-IV-%E2%80%A2-July-August-
2020.pdf 
Ogutu, M. (2020). Caught between Africa and the West: Kenya’s proposed US free trade 
agreement. Africa Portal. https://www.africaportal.org/features/caught-between-africa-and-the-
west-kenyas-proposed-us-free-trade-agreement/ 
Onguny, P. (2020). Why the Kenya-Somalia Maritime Dispute Is Far from Over, Regardless of 
the International Court of Justice Ruling. Africa Policy Journal, pp. 41–51. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/2403112253?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true 
Paduano, S. (2020). As Africa Faces COVID-19, Chinese Debt Relief is a Welcome 
Development. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/africa-faces-covid-19-
chinese-debt-relief-welcome-development 
15 
Pilling, D. (2020). Ethiopia’s Nile mega-dam is changing dynamics in Horn of Africa. 
https://www.ft.com/content/bdb2c384-2406-4f64-bde1-c2878ff520cd 
Shiferaw, L. T. (2020). Testing the relationship: China’s ‘Corona diplomacy’ in Africa. ECDPM. 
https://ecdpm.org/talking-points/testing-relationship-china-corona-diplomacy-africa/ 
Sidiropoulos, E. (2020). Africa after COVID-19 and the retreat of globalism. 
https://www.africaportal.org/publications/africa-after-covid-19-and-retreat-globalism/ 
Signé, L., & van der Ven, C. (2020). How the AfCFTA will improve access to ‘essential products’ 
and bolster Africa’s resilience to respond to future pandemics. Brookings. 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/04/30/how-the-afcfta-will-improve-access-to-
essential-products-and-bolster-africas-resilience-to-respond-to-future-pandemics/ 
Tetui, Moses (2020). Coronavirus in East Africa | Think Global Health. Council on Foreign 
Relations. https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/coronavirus-east-africa 
UNCTAD. (2020). COVID-19 accelerates greater trade coordination in East Africa. Unctad.Org. 
https://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=2411 
Van Staden, C. (2020). COVID-19: Not much give from China in its relationship with Africa. Africa 
Portal. https://www.africaportal.org/features/covid-19-not-much-give-china-its-relationship-africa/ 
Vertin, Z. (2020). Great power rivalry in the Red Sea: China’s experiment in Djibouti and 
implications for the United States. GLOBAL CHINA, 31. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/FP_20200615_china_djibouti_vertin.pdf 
Weber, A. (2020). Covid-19 in the Horn of Africa. Gaining Trust in a Crisis (p. 8). 
https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2020C20_HornofAfrica.pdf 
World Bank. (2020a). COVID 19: Debt Service Suspension Initiative [Text/HTML]. World Bank. 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/covid-19-debt-service-suspension-initiative 
World Bank. (2020b). Ethiopia global outlook. 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/471041492188157207/mpo-eth.pdf 
World Bank. (2020c). Kenya global outlook. 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/171341492188161402/mpo-ken.pdf 
World Bank. (2020d). Somalia global outlook. 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/752311492188170790/mpo-som.pdf 
World Bank. (2020e). South Sudan global outlook. 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/713731492188171377/mpo-ssd.pdf 
World Bank. (2020f). Sudan global outlook. 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/375291492188168999/mpo-sdn.pdf 
Ylönen, A. (2018). Is the Horn of Africa’s ‘Cold War’ over? Abiy Ahmed’s early reforms and the 
rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. African Security Review, 27(3–4), 245–252. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2019.1569079 
16 
Ylönen, A. (2020). Aspects, Current Concerns, and the Stalemate in Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam. 40. https://horninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/HORN-Bulletin-Vol-
III-%E2%80%A2-Iss-IV-%E2%80%A2-July-August-2020.pdf 
Yusuf, Semir, POLICY BRIEF COVID-19 and Political Stability in Ethiopia, Institute for Security 
Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb143-2.pdf 
Acknowledgements 
We thank the following experts who voluntarily provided suggestions for relevant literature or 
other advice to the author to support the preparation of this report.  The content of the report 
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of any of the experts consulted. 
 Mwita Chacha, University of Birmingham 
 Federico Donelli, University of Genoa 
 David Styan, Birkbeck University 
 Christopher Clapham, Cambridge University 
 Manu Lekunze, University of Aberdeen 
 Stephen Paduano, London School of Economics 
 Philip Onguny, Université Saint-Paul 
Suggested citation 
Kelly, L. (2020). Immediate and longer-term impacts of Covid-19 on geopolitics in East Africa. 
K4D Helpdesk Report 846. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. 
About this report 
This report is based on six days of desk-based research. The K4D research helpdesk provides rapid syntheses 
of a selection of recent relevant literature and international expert thinking in response to specific questions 
relating to international development. For any enquiries, contact helpdesk@k4d.info. 
K4D services are provided by a consortium of leading organisations working in international development, led by 
the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), with Education Development Trust, Itad, University of Leeds Nuffield 
Centre for International Health and Development, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (LSTM), University of 
Birmingham International Development Department (IDD) and the University of Manchester Humanitarian and 
Conflict Response Institute (HCRI). 
This report was prepared for the UK Government’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) and its partners in support of pro-poor programmes. It is licensed for 
non-commercial purposes only. K4D cannot be held responsible for errors or any 
consequences arising from the use of information contained in this report. Any views and 
opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of DFID, K4D or any other contributing 
organisation. © DFID - Crown copyright 2020. 
